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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent legal battles in the lender-borrower arena have received
widespread attention. The fact that these battles occur merits little sur-
prise because borrowers often seek recourse against lenders when finan-
cial commitments go awry. Moreover, recent lender-borrower cases do
not introduce any new legal theories. The outcome is the noteworthy
feature of these cases. Borrowers increasingly are obtaining judgments
against lenders.
This Note examines recent lender-borrower cases from a contrac-
tual perspective, analyzing the application of traditional contract prin-
ciples in the lender-borrower context. Part II of this Note contends that




courts are trying to address three concerns in the lender-borrower con-
text: maintenance of banking stability through enforcement of written
contracts, avoidance of adhesion contracts, and provision of legal re-
course to borrowers against abusive lending practices. Part III considers
several state legislatures' attempts to deal with these concerns by
amending their Statutes of Frauds. Finally, Part IV concludes that the
state legislatures' use of the Statutes of Frauds better addresses the
concerns of banking stability, adhesion contracts, and abusive lending
practices than recent judicial efforts.
II. EFFECTIVENESS OF A WRITING
A. Actions Prior to a Written Agreement
1. Parol Evidence Rule
a. Overview
Once a contract is reduced to writing, courts favor the written doc-
ument over all other evidence in interpreting the parties' intent. The
parol evidence rule, which ensures that the court will defer to the writ-
ten agreement, is intended to promote business stability by aspiring to
give legal effect to the parties' intent to make their writing a final and
complete expression of their agreement.1 If the written contract is in-
tended to be complete, it is termed "integrated," and the parol evidence
rule may prohibit evidence of prior or contemporaneous negotiations.2
If the contract is not intended to be a complete expression, it is termed
"unintegrated," and the parol evidence rule does not apply.3
If the written agreement is considered integrated it must be ex-
amined further to determine whether this integration is partial or com-
plete. The difference between a partially or completely integrated
contract depends on the degree to which the parties intended the writ-
ten document to express their agreement. A partially integrated agree-
ment constitutes a final expression of the terms it addresses, but not a
complete expression of all the agreed upon terms. A completely inte-
grated agreement represents a final and complete expression of all the
terms on which the parties agreed.4
If an agreement is completely integrated, the parol evidence rule
bars evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements that contradict
1. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.3, at 451 (1982).
2. Id. Admittance of this evidence depends on the degree of integration and whether the
evidence supplements or contradicts the written agreement. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. § 7.3, at 452.
[Vol. 42:917
LENDER LIABILITY
or supplement a term in the contract.6 Partial integration, however, al-
lows evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements to supplement
the terms of the contract, but not to contradict them.6 Thus, once at-
tached, these labels determine how the parol evidence rule will affect a
particular document.
b. Approaches Used to Determine Applicability of the Parol Evi-
dence Rule
The process used to attach these labels varies among courts. In
general, a broad range of evidence, including evidence of prior negotia-
tions, may be used to determine whether a written agreement is inte-
grated.7 Once a court determines that the contract is integrated, a
variety of approaches is used to determine whether the integration is
partial or complete. The approach taken by the court to decide the par-
tial or complete integration question is important because this ap-
proach will determine the scope of the parol evidence rule.
One approach taken by courts focuses solely on the terms of the
written agreement. This approach, called the "four-corners" test, allows
parol evidence only if the document appears incomplete on its face.'
Hence, under this approach a court may inspect only the writing in or-
der to determine the parties' intent concerning complete integration.
Although commentators have observed a softening of this test,9 the
four-corners approach clearly shows great deference to the intent of the
parties as expressed in the written agreement.
Sedalia Mercantile Bank & Trust Co. v. Loges Farms, Inc.10 illus-
trates the four-corners approach. Loges Farms involved a restructuring
of the defendant's debt by the plaintiff-bank. Part of the documenta-
tion for this transaction included a "loan agreement," which stated that
the defendant must furnish complete and accurate financial data to the
bank. The defendant, however, was unable to make payments under
this restructured agreement, so the parties agreed on written modifica-
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 215 (1981) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS]; see also U.C.C. § 2-202 (1987) (containing similar language).
6. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, supra note 5, §§ 210(2), 215, 216. Again the U.C.C. language
is similar. See U.C.C. § 2-202 (1987).
7. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, supra note 5, § 209(3) (stating that a reasonably complete
written agreement is considered an integrated agreement "unless it is established by other evi-
dence that the writing did not constitute a final expression"); E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 7.3,
at 453.
8. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 7.3, at 455.
9. Farnsworth notes that some courts consider a strict four-corners reading to be useless in
determining the degree of integration. These courts allow parties to introduce some of the sur-
rounding circumstances, but exclude any evidence of prior negotiations. Id. § 7.3, at 456.
10. 740 S.W.2d 188 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
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tions extending the due dates. The defendant also failed to provide
complete financial data by neglecting to inform the bank of an out-
standing loan. The bank considered this omission a breach of the loan
agreement and called the notes due. The defendant, however, argued
that the modification agreements were fully integrated. Thus, because
the loan agreement was not mentioned in the subsequent agreements,
the parol evidence rule barred its admittance as part of the contract.
Without the loan agreement, no breach of contract existed."
The Missouri appellate court, basing its decision on the language of
the modification agreements, held that the modification agreements
were fully integrated. 2 These modification agreements made reference
to other documents executed at the time of the restructuring of debt
and, thus, incorporated them into the parties' loan agreement. The loan
agreement, however, was not mentioned. The court, therefore, refused
to admit the loan agreement, because it would have added to the terms
of a fully integrated agreement."
Despite cases like Loges Farms, the trend has been away from the
four-corners test and toward approaches that more liberally admit the
contested evidence. Professor Samuel Williston has promulgated a more
liberal approach that has become the majority rule in this country. 4
Like the four-corners test, this approach first focuses on the writing it-
self. If the writing is obviously incomplete, then parol evidence may be
admitted to prove consistent additional terms. If the writing is not ob-
viously incomplete, then it is deemed completely integrated, unless the
additional terms naturally might have been made in a separate agree-
ment. In such a case, the agreement is considered partially integrated.1
5
By considering what might be made "naturally" as a separate agree-
ment, this test does not focus on the actual intent of the contracting
parties but on the fictitious intent of a reasonable person. 6 This rea-
sonable person approach, therefore, provides some latitude to courts in
deciding the issue of integration.
Bank of Beverly Hills v. Catain17 illustrates the application of this
approach in the lender-borrower context. On March 28, 1978, the de-
fendant borrowed forty thousand dollars from the plaintiff-bank, exe-
cuting a promissory note which stated that the note was due on
11. Id. at 193.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 194.
14. 4 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 633-644 (3d ed. 1961).
15. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 3-4, at 147-48 (3d ed. 1987).
16. Id. at 148.
17. 128 Cal. App. 3d 28, 180 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1982).
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demand, or, if no demand was made, on September 20, 1978.18 The
bank made no demand prior to September 20, and the defendant failed
to pay on this date. The plaintiff-bank subsequently brought suit to
recover on the note. The defendant alleged that the plaintiff-bank had
represented that on maturity a repayment schedule would be imple-
mented and the terms of the note renegotiated. The lower court granted
summary judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant moved for re-
consideration.19 In support of the reconsideration motion, the defend-
ant introduced the declaration of the loan officer who had negotiated
the loan and the "loan approval sheet," dated March 16, 1978. Both
pieces of evidence supported the defendant's allegation. A California
district court, however, denied reconsideration because this evidence re-
lated to incidents occurring prior to the execution of the written
agreement.20
A California appellate court reversed the lower court's decision.
The appellate court noted initially that summary judgment was proper
only if the documents relied on by the defendant were inadmissible evi-
dence under the California parol evidence rule.21 The court then ap-
plied a two-pronged test to determine the admissibility of the
evidence.2 2 This test evaluated the credibility of the proffered evidence
and excluded it only if such evidence would be likely to mislead the fact
finder.23 The first prong looked at the collateral agreement to determine
it if was the type of agreement that parties in this situation naturally
would make by a separate agreement.24 Answering affirmatively, the
court stated that if the loan officer's declaration was credible, then it
18. Id. at 30, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
19. Id. at 33, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
20. Id. at 32, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
21. Id. at 34, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
22. Catain, 128 Cal. App. 3d at 35, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 71. The California Supreme Court cre-
ated this test in Masterson v. Sine, 68 Cal. 2d 222, 436 P.2d 561, 65 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1968). Several
sources guided the California Supreme Court: First, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts §
240(1)(b), allowing proof of a collateral agreement if it "might naturally be made as a separate
agreement by parties situated as were the parties to the written contract," RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS, supra note 5, § 240(1)(b) (emphasis added), and second, U.C.C. § 2-202, allowing even
more parol evidence by permitting admittance of evidence in a case if it does not represent terms
that "would certainly" have been in the written agreement, U.C.C. § 2-202 official comment 3
(1987) (emphasis added).
23. Catain, 128 Cal. App. 3d at 35, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
24. Id. at 37, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 72. This test must be distinguished from the collateral con-
tract rule, which allows for collateral agreements even upon finding the document to be completely
integrated, so long as the collateral agreements do not contradict the main agreement. An entirely
separate and distinct agreement may be made by the parties, even though the consideration for
this agreement flows from the main agreement. As Farnsworth points out, what is really being




would be appropriate to determine a repayment schedule in a separate
agreement.
25
The second prong looked at the collateral agreement to determine
if that agreement normally would be incorporated in the written agree-
ment.26 The Catain court held that this agreement properly would be
left to the bank's records because this type of agreement could impair
the negotiability of the note if disclosed on the note itself.27 Analyzed
under this two-pronged test, therefore, the proffered evidence was not
likely to mislead a fact finder and should have been admitted. Thus,
the court allowed the additional term, renegotiation of the manner of
repayment, to supplement the note28 because the additional term did
not contradict any expressed provisions of the written agreement.
In determining that this agreement supplemented the promissory
note, the Catain court distinguished two prior cases. 29 In these cases
the borrowing party argued that it did not owe money to the bank.
Both courts held that the parol evidence rule barred this argument be-
cause it contradicted an integrated contract. In Catain, however, the
borrowing party admitted its debt and only contested the manner of
payment. A term calling for renegotiation of the manner of payment,
the Catain court reasoned, was not contradictory to the terms of the
promissory note, which required payment in full on a specific date.
Such tenuous reasoning, while keeping the parol evidence rule theoreti-
cally intact, diminishes the rule's application.
The most liberal approach, proposed by Professor Arthur Corbin,30
rejects the reasonable person approach and seeks to ascertain the actual
25. Catain, 128 Cal. App. 3d at 37, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
26. Id. at 37, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 72-73.
27. Id. at 37, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
28. Id. at 36, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 72. The court appears to have combined the analysis for
determining whether a written agreement is integrated and differentiating between a partially and
completely integrated document. According to Farnsworth, the parol evidence rule applies only if a
writing is integrated. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 7.3, at 456. Thus, only integrated writings
cannot be contradicted by extrinsic evidence. The Catain court stated that this two-pronged test
determined the question of integration. This test, however, is not intended to destroy the parol
evidence rule by allowing extrinsic evidence to contradict an express term of the written agree-
ment. If the test addresses the initial question of integration, then extrinsic evidence contradicting
an expressed term is allowable upon a finding of nonintegration. The parol evidence rule is not
weakened because the rule is inapplicable. If the test precludes evidence contradicting an ex-
pressed term of the written agreement and permits evidence of a collateral or additional term, it
essentially is determining whether the agreement is partially integrated. Thus, the test already
assumes the existence of an integrated agreement. Hence, although a court may label this a test to
determine integration, its practical effect is to distinguish partially integrated documents from
completely integrated ones.
29. Coast Bank v. Holmes, 19 Cal. App. 3d 581, 97 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1971); Sapin v. Security
First Nat'l Bank, 243 Cal. App. 2d 201, 52 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1966).
30. 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 582, at 444 (1960).
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intent of the contracting parties. To accomplish this task, this approach
requires a court to examine all of the circumstances surrounding an
agreement, including evidence of prior negotiations. Corbin's approach
allows a court to admit the very evidence being challenged to determine
the question of total integration. 1 Proponents argue that the complete-
ness of a particular writing can be determined only in light of all the
circumstances. 2 Such an approach, however, undercuts the purpose of
the parol evidence rule.
Corbin's and Williston's approaches to determine the existence of
integration dilute both the parol evidence rule itself and written con-
tracts in general. In the lender-borrower context, the weakening of the
parol evidence rule favors borrowers because loan agreements typically
are standardized forms drafted by the bank and may not encompass the
entire scope of the parties' agreement. Borrowers often have little
power to change the terms of these written agreements.33 Admitting pa-
rol evidence permits a court to investigate the intent of the parties
fully.
Thus, Corbin's and Williston's approaches provide courts with the
latitude to avoid enforcement of adhesion contracts. These approaches,
however, undermine the stability of the banking industry. Banks make
numerous loans each day and must be able to rely upon the enforceabil-
ity of the documents executed in conjunction with these loans. Given
this tension, it is not surprising to find that courts are attempting to
maintain stability in the banking industry despite the erosion of the
parol evidence rule.
2. Merger and Disclaimer Clauses
One contractual method of providing stability to the contracting
parties is a merger clause. A merger clause states that the agreement is
completely integrated, thereby merging prior negotiations into the writ-
ing." Courts often uphold merger clauses as conclusive in determining
the question of complete integration. 5 Notwithstanding the presence of
31. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 15, § 3-4, at 149.
32. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 7.3, at 456. The commentary to § 210 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts states that "a writing cannot of itself prove its own completeness, and wide
latitude must be allowed for inquiry into circumstances bearing on the intention of the parties."
RESTATEMENT OF CoTrrmcws, supra note 5, § 210 comment b.
33. A recent article, pointing out the plight of the "powerless" borrowers against "arrogant
bankers," described an exchange that allegedly took place between two parties. The borrower, con-
vinced that the bank was not processing its loan diligently, complained that the bank was not
acting in good faith. The bank officer's response: "Screw good faith. We're going to do it our way."
Bailey, Banks Hit by Borrowers' Liability Suits, Wall St. J., June 2, 1988, § 2, at 3, col. 6.
34. J. CALAMARI & J. PERmLO, supra note 15, § 3-6, at 156.
35. See, e.g., Braten v. Bankers Trust Co., 60 N.Y.2d 155, 162, 456 N.E.2d 802, 805, 468
19891
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a merger clause, some causes of action will allow courts to admit parol
evidence. 6 Courts, however, attempting to further stability, have relied
on "disclaimer clauses" in contracts to foreclose the admittance of parol
evidence even in some of these circumstances.
Citibank v. Plapinger37 demonstrates how a disclaimer clause in a
written guaranty may disallow parol evidence even when the borrowing
party claims fraudulent misrepresentation as a defense. In Plapinger
the plaintiff-banks restructured the defendant's indebtedness into a
15.2 million dollar term loan guaranteed by the defendant. The defend-
ant alleged that neither he nor the other shareholders would agree to
sign the commitment letter for this restructuring unless the plaintiff-
banks agreed to establish an additional eight million dollar line of
credit. The plaintiff-banks, according to the defendant, agreed to this
request.38 The defendant executed an unconditional guaranty that con-
tained a merger clause and a disclaimer clause. The disclaimer clause
stated that the borrower was not executing the guaranty in reliance on
39any oral representations made by the lender.
The line of credit never materialized, and the defendant subse-
quently filed for bankruptcy. The plaintiff-banks sued to recover on the
guaranty. The defendant's answer set up several defenses, including
fraudulent inducement, and counterclaimed based on fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, and breach of contract. A New York trial court
granted judgment for the plaintiff-banks, holding that the defendant
expressly had waived his right to assert the defenses and counterclaims
as part of the unconditional guaranty.40
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision,
relying specifically on the disclaimer clause. The court stated that the
defendant had strong evidence of fraud, but because the disclaimer lan-
guage was so specific the court foreclosed, as a matter of law, the claims
N.Y.S.2d 861, 864 (1983) (stating that a court must look to surrounding circumstances to deter-
mine integration only in absence of a merger clause); see also Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc.,
705 S.W.2d 42, 51 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a guaranty was completely integrated because
it stated that "there are no conditions or limitations to this guaranty except those written or
printed herein, and no alteration, change, or modification shall be made except in writing").
36. These causes of action include evidence to show that the entire contract was to be a
nullity, and not that certain provisions were unenforceable; that a condition precedent did exist;
that consideration was lacking; or that the contract was voidable due to mistake, misrepresenta-
tion, or duress. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 7.4, at 461-67; see also K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust
Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985) (stating that whether the standard for waiver of the right to a
jury trial had been met was a constitutional question, which precluded the operation of parol evi-
dence rule to bar extrinsic evidence bearing on this question).
37. 66 N.Y.2d 90, 485 N.E.2d 974, 495 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1985).
38. Id. at 93, 485 N.E.2d at 975, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 310.
39. Id. at 95, 485 N.E.2d at 977, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 312.
40. Id. at 92, 485 N.E.2d at 975, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 310.
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based on fraud.41 The court held that the language of the contract
barred the defendant from establishing reliance on the oral promise al-
legedly made by the plaintiff-banks."2 According to the Plapinger court,
allowing the defendant to show fraud despite his own specific dis-
claimer of reliance on oral representations would make the defendant
guilty of deliberately misrepresenting his real intentions.3
The court distinguished language used to create general merger
clauses from language used to create specific disclaimer clauses.."
Merger clauses, unlike disclaimer clauses, will not preclude the admit-
tance of parol evidence to establish a claim of fraudulent inducement.
Such a distinction, of course, causes a careful draftsman to employ both
merger and disclaimer clauses. For this reason critics argue that the
Plapinger court's holding encourages the use of boilerplate language
and more verbose merger clauses.'5 Responding to this criticism, the
Plapinger court pointed out that this disclaimer clause was not boiler-
plate, but arose from lengthy negotiations between sophisticated busi-
ness people who put together a multimillion dollar personal guaranty
declared by the defendant to be absolute and unconditional. 6 Thus, af-
ter Plapinger, a prudent draftsman should take steps to distinguish a
disclaimer clause from mere boilerplate language.
The Texas Supreme Court, in Town North National Bank v.
41. Id. at 93, 485 N.E.2d at 975, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 310.
42. Id. at 95, 485 N.E.2d at 977, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 312.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 94, 485 N.E.2d at 976, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 311; accord Fogel v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 127
A.D.2d 548, 512 N.Y.S.2d 109 (App. Div. 1987) (holding that a general merger clause would not
preclude evidence of fraudulent inducement). A waiver clause, in which a party waives his right to
assert certain counterclaims and defenses, is equally ineffective. National Westminster Bank v.
Ross, 676 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that a written waiver in any form cannot shield a
party from his own fraud).
45. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 15, § 9-21, at 371-72. These authors recom-
mend making a distinction between negotiated clauses and standard form clauses, rather than the
current distinction between merger and disclaimer clauses. This recommendation seeks to further
the borrower's ability to negotiate terms and not be bound by boilerplate terms that approach the
level of an adhesion contract.
46. Although the Plapinger court did not mention this, public policy concerns advocate up-
holding these clauses. In Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Skeist, 49 A.D.2d 215, 373 N.Y.S.2d 869 (App.
Div. 1975), the court noted:
The stability of banks is a matter of such public concern that the state or federal government
regulates the affairs of each bank and periodically examines its apparent condition. The state
cannot sanction any device intended to give a false appearance to a transaction or increase
the apparent stability of a bank.. . . Public policy requires that a person who, for the accom-
modation of the bank, executes an instrument which is in form a binding obligation, should
be estopped from thereafter asserting that simultaneously the parties agreed that the instru-
ment should not be enforced.
Id. at 219-20, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 874 (quoting Mount Vernon Trust Co. v. Bergoff, 272 N.Y. 192, 196,
5 N.E.2d 196, 197 (1936)). The desire to avoid the use of boilerplate, or not bargained-for, language
may be outweighed by the public policy concerns for a stable banking industry.
1989]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Broaddus,47 promulgated a parol evidence rule similar to, but less re-
strictive than, the parol evidence rule set forth by the New York court
in Plapinger. The Broaddus court stated that parol evidence only will
be allowed to prove fraud in the inducement of a note when a party
shows some type of trickery, artifice, or device used by the payee and
alleges that the payee promised that the maker would not be liable on
such a note.48 Thus, according to the Broaddus court, a party cannot
base its claim of fraudulent inducement solely on allegations of an oral
promise.49
The Broaddus court gave several examples of the additional proof
necessary to preclude application of the parol evidence rule. One exam-
ple cited by the court was Berry v. Abilene Savings Association,50 in
which a borrower, who was unable to borrow funds himself, conspired
with a loan officer to have a third party sign the note and receive the
loan proceeds. The loan officer assured the third party signing the note
that he would not be liable on the note. This inducement of nonliability
to the third party in order to achieve financing for the original borrower
constituted a fraudulent device.51 Another case cited by the Broaddus
court, Viracola v. Dallas International Bank, 2 involved a bank that
requested a corporate president to co-sign a note and to pledge his
stock in the corporation in order for the corporation to obtain a loan to
support its operations. At the time of the loan, the president was in-
volved in negotiations for the company's sale, and the bank assured the
president that his co-signing the note and pledging his stock were only
to guarantee payment from the proceeds of the sale. The bank further
assured the president that in the event the sale was not consummated
his personal liability would end.53 The bank subsequently attempted to
enforce this note despite the failure of the sale. The Viracola court
stated that this situation constituted a fraudulent device.
4
The Broaddus court noted, however, that the facts in Lindeburg v.
Gulfway National Bank55 did not amount to a deceptive scheme. In
Lindeburg a bank officer told a loan customer that the bank officer had
a no-risk deal but lacked cash. The bank officer suggested that the cus-
tomer take out a bank loan, which this officer would approve, and then
47. 569 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1978).
48. Id. at 494.
49. Id. at 492.
50. 513 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
51. Id. at 874.
52. 508 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
53. Id. at 473.
54. Id. at 474.
55. 624 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981); see also Bailey v. Gulfway Nat'l Bank, 626 S.W.2d
70 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981).
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give the proceeds of the loan to the bank officer. The officer then would
execute a note in favor of the customer for that amount. The customer
agreed and the transactions were completed. Shortly thereafter, the
bank officer disappeared and the bank brought action against the cus-
tomer on the note that he had executed in favor of the bank. The court
held that no deceptive scheme was employed because the defendant
was interested simply in improving his own borrowing power and help-
ing a friend, the loan officer, by borrowing funds from the bank.5 6
None of these examples clearly defines what constitutes trickery or
a fraudulent device. Given these examples and little commentary by the
court, it is difficult to determine the parameters of the Broaddus rule.
Certainly this parol evidence rule provides courts with a clean concep-
tual test to determine the admissibility of parol evidence; but it pro-
vides little practical guidance as to its application. At the very least, the
Broaddus parol evidence rule will ensure that parties plead and argue
the claim of fraudulent inducement with enough factual specificity to
facilitate a finding of a deceptive scheme and, thus, to allow parol evi-
dence to be introduced.
The Plapinger and Broaddus holdings demonstrate the extent to
which some courts will go to maintain stability in the banking industry
despite the demise of the parol evidence rule. On the one hand, these
courts feared that any party, by claiming fraud, could introduce extrin-
sic evidence that contradicted the written agreement. The practical ef-
fect of allowing this extrinsic evidence to be introduced would be to
destroy the parol evidence rule and reduce promissory notes to a
"'meaningless scrap of paper.' ,,57 On the other hand, both courts recog-
nized that a fraudulently induced document does not express the intent
of the parties, and the only way to prove the parties' intent is by admit-
ting parol evidence. Thus, the Broaddus court sought to balance these
two concerns by admitting parol evidence if a party can prove that he
fraudulently was induced into signing a note through a deceptive arti-
fice or device. The Plapinger court, however, overcompensated in favor
of banking stability by foreclosing any opportunity to admit parol evi-
dence proving fraudulent inducement in certain circumstances.
Although the parol evidence rule helps to maintain banking stabil-
ity by protecting the integrity of written agreements, it is limited be-
cause it only excludes evidence of prior or contemporaneous
negotiations. The parol evidence rule does not affect evidence of actions
or promises occurring after the execution of the written agreement.
56. Lindeburg, 624 S.W.2d at 281.
57. Broaddus, 569 S.W.2d at 492 (quoting Howeth v. Davenport, 311 S.W.2d 480, 482 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1958)).
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B. Actions Subsequent to a Written Agreement
An agreement defines the actions expected of each party and dis-
penses certain powers and rights. In this respect, an agreement is pre-
scriptive in nature and influences the parties' actions." Subsequent
action, however, also can influence the nature and terms of the original
agreement. Thus, a party should view a potential act from at least two
perspectives: how an agreement defines the particular act, and how that
act might modify the written agreement.
1. Modification of Written Agreements
a. Overview
A written agreement can be modified orally by the parties, but such
a modification may require adequate consideration" and may be sub-
ject to the Statute of Frauds.60 Mutual agreements to modify a written
agreement may be express, but also can be inferred from the parties'
conduct and the surrounding circumstances.6 1
58. Of course, the law can impose duties upon contracting parties that extend beyond the
terms of the agreement. As a result, several courts have dealt with lender-borrower cases by focus-
ing on the lender-borrower relationship rather than on the written agreements. In particular, some
courts have classified the lender-borrower relationship as one of trust and confidence, finding cer-
tain duties based on this classification. Most courts, however, require special circumstances to cre-
ate something more than a mere lender-borrower relationship. See, e.g., Klein v. First Edina Nat'l
Bank, 293 Minn. 418, 196 N.W.2d 619 (1972) (stating that a bank has no special duty to its cus-
tomers unless special circumstances exist). Several courts, on the other hand, have set a low stan-
dard to create such a relationship. See, e.g., Barrett v. Bank of Am., 183 Cal. App. 3d 1362, 229
Cal. Rptr. 16 (1986) (holding that the borrower perceived his relationship with the lender as being
close and, therefore, implicitly relied on the lender's advice); First Nat'l Bank v. Brown, 181
N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1970) (holding that the lender had a duty to disclose because he knew or should
have known that the borrower trusted him implicitly); see also Special Project Note, Lender Lia-
bility, supra, at notes 64-134 and accompanying text.
59. The pre-existing duty rule requires a modification to have consideration separate from
the original agreement. Thus, a promisee, receiving a promise to modify an agreement, cannot
promise simply to perform a pre-existing duty created by the previous agreement. This rule has
been subjected to criticism and legislative change. See U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (1987) (abolishing the
consideration requirement). Some states circumvent the rule by making a signed writing a substi-
tute for consideration. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 566.1 (West Supp. 1988); N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAW § 5-1103 (McKinney Supp. 1988). Yet courts still apply this rule in the lender-bor-
rower context. See, e.g., F.S. Credit Corp. v. Shear Elevator, Inc., 377 .N.W.2d 227 (Iowa 1985)
(holding that an additional extension of credit was adequate consideration to modify security
agreement); First Pa. Mortgage Trust v. Dorchester Say. Bank, 395 Mass. 614, 481 N.E.2d 1132
(1982) (holding that an oral modification of a loan participation agreement was supported by ade-
quate consideration); South Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Silks, 295 S.C. 107, 367 S.E.2d 421 (Ct. App.
1988) (stating that an oral modification of a promissory note needed to be supported by
consideration).
60. The Statute of Frauds only applies if the modification itself falls within the Statute of
Frauds, notwithstanding that the original agreement was within the Statute of Frauds. E. FARNS-
WORTH, supra note 1, § 6.2, at 377.
61. Silks, 295 S.C. at 108, 367 S.E.2d at 422; see also E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 7.5, at
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Contracting parties cannot prevent modifications through "no-oral-
modification" clauses. Common law generally refuses to recognize these
clauses.6 2 Some states have changed this common-law rule by enacting
statutes that enforce "no oral modification" clauses. New York, for ex-
ample, upholds such clauses unless the modification or termination is in
writing and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought.6 3
The New York statute, however, allows evidence of an oral modification
if the party seeking the statutory protection is estopped from disclaim-
ing the modification or the other party has acted in reliance on the
modification.6 4 Given these two exceptions, the New York statute af-
fects only executory oral agreements.6 "
In states that have not adopted statutes recognizing "no oral modi-
fication" clauses, the common-law rule offers little protection for parties
seeking to prevent modification. Yet, the quality of proof necessary to
modify an agreement does afford some protection. Generally, the proof
must be specific enough to show that the parties clearly intended to
change their written agreement.6 This safeguard, however, provides lit-
tle guidance for a lender in its daily activities because courts have held
that the "persuasive character" of the evidence need not be express and
may arise inferentially.
6 7
The danger of modification often arises when the lender and bor-
rower renegotiate a loan agreement. In this situation the borrower typi-
cally finds himself in financial difficulty, and the lender is trying to
protect the initial loan by agreeing to provide further financing, or by
rescheduling the payments if the borrower promises to repay. Impres-
sions created during these negotiations often may affect the lender's
rights adversely should these negotiations turn sour.
474-76.
62. Dorchester Say. Bank, 395 Mass. at 614, 481 N.E.2d at 1132.
63. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-301 (McKinney Supp. 1988); see also CAL. Crv. CODE § 1698
(West 1985); U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (1987).
64. See In re Global Int'l Airways, 35 Bankr. 881 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983).
65. This statute seeks to protect a written agreement from false claims of modification.
When there has been partial or complete performance of an oral modification, the need for such
protection is lessened. Yet this partial performance will result in modification only if it refers
unequivocally to the oral modification. National Westminster Bank v. Ross, 676 F. Supp. 48
(S.D.N.Y. 1987). Substantial reliance on an oral modification may also trigger the statute's applica-
bility. The party seeking recognition of the modification must rely on conduct incompatible with
the agreement as written. Id. at 53 (assurances of increased financing were incompatible because
they were not in any of the written agreements).
66. See Hamilton Bank v. Rulnick, 327 Pa. Super. 133, 138, 475 A.2d 134, 137 (1984). The
Rulnick court noted: "'The oral evidence must be of such a persuasive character that it moves like
an ink eradicator across the written paper, leaving it blank so that the parties in effect start afresh
in their . . . mutual commitments."' Id. (quoting Gloeckner v. Baldwin Township School Dist.,
405 Pa. 197, 200, 175 A.2d 73, 75 (1961)).
67. See, e.g., id.
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b. Judicial Responses to Subsequent Negotiations
Alaska Statebank v. Faircol8 demonstrates the potential impact of
negotiations subsequent to the execution of a written agreement in the
lender-borrower context."' In Fairco the plaintiff, Fairco, borrowed one
hundred twenty thousand dollars in February 1977, and fifty thousand
dollars in February 1978 from the defendant-bank, executing a security
agreement each time. The security agreement for the fifty thousand
dollar note contained a provision that allowed the bank to accelerate all
indebtedness without notice if Fairco defaulted under any of the loan
provisions. The security agreement also provided for payment on de-
mand or in installments.70 Fairco missed the first installment payment,
and both parties agreed that this amount would be paid on December
15, 1978, when the entire balance was due. The written security agree-
ment was amended to reflect this understanding.71 Fairco then failed to
make payments on the next two installment dates. A bank officer's in-
vestigation revealed that Fairco was in serious financial trouble, having
insufficient income to pay debts as they became due and no original
equity because of operating losses. On October 16, the bank officer met
with the partners of Fairco to discuss this situation. Fairco wanted to
delay repayment of the notes until after Christmas but the officer re-
fused. On November 3, 1978, a proposal was sent to Fairco agreeing to
grant the requested extension if the partners of Fairco would provide
the bank with deeds of trust on their personal residences as collateral.
The proposal also stated that it would expire on November 8, 1978, at
one o'clock in the afternoon. Fairco subsequently made a counterpro-
posal on November 6, but the bank rejected it.
72
Unable to reach a new understanding, the bank decided to proceed
against the collateral offered as security for the original agreement. On
November 6, a bank officer went to Clowntown, the store owned by
Fairco, and closed the store, changed the locks, and secured the ac-
counts. The bank then setoff Fairco's checking account against the debt
owed to the bank. The next day Fairco repossessed the store, and the
bank presented the partnership with a written demand for payment.7 3
On November 8, Fairco accepted the bank's original proposal. After
refinancing the loan at another institution, Fairco brought suit against
Statebank. Fairco's complaint alleged that the bank had acted unrea-
68. 674 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1983).
69. See Special Project Note, Lender Liability, supra, notes 29-57 and accompanying text.
70. Fairco, 674 P.2d at 289.
71. Id.




sonably in repossessing the collateral, resulting in damage to the busi-
ness and personal reputations of Fairco's partners. The complaint also
alleged that the bank had breached its duty of good faith. 4
Because of the parties' course of dealings, their continued negotia-
tions, and the absence of a demand for payment, an Alaska superior
court concluded that the parties had modified their written agree-
ment.7 5 Thus, the court held that no default existed at the time of re-
possession by the bank.76 Further, even if a default did exist on the fifty
thousand dollar note, the bank had waived the default by failing to de-
mand payment or give notice of default." In particular, the superior
court concluded that the partners of Fairco left the October 16 meeting
with the "reasonable impression" that the bank would not require pay-
ment until after Christmas.
7 8
The Alaska Supreme Court, in affirming this decision, emphasized
that liability in lender-borrower cases often arises from the lender's
practice of accepting late payments or creating an impression that an
arrearage need not be paid immediately.7 9 Thus, before the lender can
sue on the note, it must notify the borrower that strict compliance with
the agreement is going to be enforced in the future. After the lender
notifies the borrower of its intention to enforce the agreement, it may
call the loan due on the next default.
80
It is difficult, however, to ascertain the course of conduct that mod-
ified the security agreement for the fifty thousand dollar note in Fairco.
Looking at their course of dealings, it appears as though the bank made
it clear to Fairco that the bank intended to enforce compliance with the
written agreement. First, when Fairco defaulted on the first loan pay-
ment in June, the bank responded by executing a revised agreement
with Fairco that postponed this payment until December.8' This revi-
sion demonstrated the bank's desire for the written agreement to reflect
the actual obligations of the parties and their intention to strictly en-
force the written agreement. The court, however, ignored the bank's ac-
tions concerning the default. Second, when Fairco missed its September
and October payments, an officer of the bank met with Fairco's part-
74. Id. at 291. This duty of good faith is imposed by § 1-203 of Alaska's U.C.C. ALAsKA STAT.
§ 45.01.203 (1986).




79. The Alaska Supreme Court cited similar cases in other jurisdictions which had held the
same way. See, e.g., Pierce v. Leasing Int'l Inc., 142 Ga. App. 371, 235 S.E.2d 752 (1977); Nevada
Nat'l Bank v. Huff, 94 Nev. 506, 582 P.2d 364 (1978).
80. Fairco, 674 P.2d at 292-93.
81. Id. at 289.
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ners. This officer specifically refused Fairco's proposal to delay the
note's repayment until after Christmas.82 Yet, the court determined
that this meeting had created the impression that Fairco would not be
required to make payments until after Christmas. Third, the bank's
proposal expressly stated that the note was in default. Certainly such a
statement does not contribute to a course of dealing that would lead
Fairco's partners to believe that "no default existed. '83 Nevertheless,
the court held that the bank could not enforce the agreement as
written."4
Bank Computer Network Corp. v. Continental Illinois National
Bank8 5 presents another example of a court's willingness to allow subse-
quent negotiations to alter the terms of a written agreement. In Bank
Computer the plaintiff had signed two notes that had upcoming matur-
ity dates of January 30, 1978, and February 13, 1978, respectively. Prior
to these maturity dates, the plaintiff entered into negotiations with the
defendant-bank for an extension of both notes and an additional loan.
On February 6, 1978, the bank orally agreed to extend the notes and
lend the plaintiff additional funds. On February 14, however, the bank
sent two letters to the plaintiff. The first letter, a handwritten note,
stated that the prior oral agreement was contingent on the plaintiff
signing a personal guaranty for the entire amount of the notes. The
second letter expressed the bank's desire to be paid in full on the ma-
turity dates of the notes and outlined the procedures for the proposed
oral agreement. In addition, this letter specifically denied that it was a
proposal to advance funds. On February 21, the parties further negoti-
ated the loan agreement setting forth three new options, none of which
contemplated immediate demand for payment. The next day, however,
the bank made written and oral demands for payment of the notes and
offset the plaintiff's checking account against these debts. 6
In considering the plaintiff's claim that the bank was promissorily
estopped from collecting on the notes, an Illinois appellate court made
several observations. The court agreed with the bank that its officers
had never promised expressly in writing to forbear from collecting on
the notes by offsetting plaintiff's checking account. Yet, the court held
that the absence of such an expressed promise did not bar a claim of
promissory estoppel. In order for the bank to be estopped by its prom-
ise, the promise only needs to be unambiguous, not expressed.87 The
82. Id. at 290.
83. Id. at 292.
84. Id. at 293.
85. 110 Ill. App. 3d 492, 442 N.E.2d 586 (1982).
86. Id. at 495-96, 442 N.E.2d at 589.
87. Id. at 497, 442 N.E.2d at 591.
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court found an unambiguous promise in the letters exchanged between
the parties."' Although almost every letter acknowledged the maturity
dates of the notes, these acknowledgements were followed closely by in-
vitations to renegotiate. In fact, one of the three options presented the
day before the payment demand was a specific method of repayment.
The court held that the bank was estopped from collecting on the notes
by offsetting the plaintiff's checking account until the plaintiff had been
given a reasonable time to accept and act on this option.8 9 In addition,
the court stated that the plaintiff reasonably could have believed that
part of the oral agreement not contradicted by the subsequent written
proposal was still in effect, thereby assuring the plaintiff that the bank
would not collect until negotiations had ended.90
In contrast to Fairco and Bank Computer, which invalidated the
written agreements in order to find for the borrower, other courts have
not discarded the terms of the written agreements so quickly. In Pent-
house International, Ltd. v. Dominion Federal Savings & Loan Associ-
ation91 a savings and loan association agreed to lend Penthouse ninety-
seven million dollars on June 20, 1983, with this commitment expiring
120 days from its issuance. On November 21, 1983, over 120 days from
the issuance of the agreement, the parties agreed in writing to extend
the expiration date to December 1, 1983, and the closing of the loan to
a period no earlier than February 1, 1984, or no later than March 1,
1984. The project subsequently encountered problems and the loan
agreement began to unravel. Negotiations were conducted prior to and
after the March 1 deadline. In determining the impact of these negotia-
tions on the loan agreement, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
stated that by continuing to negotiate after March 1, the parties may
have extended the expiration date implicitly; however, because the par-
ties previously had allowed the loan commitment to expire by its own
terms, the court held that its construction of the unambiguous terms of
the subsequent documents was not at odds with the parties' expecta-
tions.92 The court concluded that its construction of the terms of these
documents would not allow continuing negotiations to bar the expira-
tion of the loan agreement.93 Because the parties had dealt in the past
88. Id. at 498, 442 N.E.2d at 591.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 499, 442 N.E.2d at 592; see also Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 335 F.2d
846 (3d Cir. 1964) (stating that the credit corporation representative's assurances, and the reasona-
ble expectations created thereby, lulled the debtor into a false sense of security and, therefore,
were tortious actions, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff knew the defendant's representa-
tive had no authority to make such assurances).
91. 855 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1988).




with a similar situation by executing a written extension, the court im-
plied that the same practice would have been used in the present situa-
tion had they intended to extend the expiration date.9
On a broader scale, these cases illustrate the influence of a reliance-
based theory on contract principles.9 5 If a party has reasonably relied
on another's assurance, expressed or implied, courts appear more will-
ing to find a modification, or to estop the other party from claiming
that the agreement has expired. The borrower, in reliance on a lender,
forecloses other financing opportunities. If a lender fails to modify the
agreement or to call a loan due, the borrower may experience severe
consequences. The lender, on the other hand, suffers only minor dam-
age because the original agreement and security arrangement normally
are still enforceable. Renegotiating loan agreements in the lender-bor-
rower context, therefore, provides a fertile ground for the extension of a
reliance-based theory of contract. The rise of a reliance-based theory of
contract and the significant impact lenders can have on borrowers par-
tially explain holdings such as Fairco and Bank Computer.
2. Precautionary Measures for Avoiding Lender Liability
a. Negotiation Techniques
Under the pro-borrower theories espoused in Fairco and Bank
Computer, a lender risks modifying or suspending its contractual rights
under a written loan agreement by negotiating alternate payment plans
with the borrower. The lender can reduce this risk, however, by taking
several precautionary measures. First, any document listing the parties'
94. This analysis, if applied to Fairco, possibly could have changed its outcome. In Fairco
when the borrower defaulted the first time, the parties executed a revised loan agreement. This
action, like the action in Penthouse, could have been interpreted as demonstrating the bank's
intention to adhere to the terms of the written agreement. Thus, when Fairco defaulted and en-
tered into further negotiations, the court could have held that the original loan agreement was in
place until a written agreement was executed. The previous actions of the parties in a similar
situation supported such a finding. The Fairco court, however, failed to address the impact of this
prior situation on the later default.
Other concerns, apart from the course of the parties' conduct, may have motivated the Pent-
house court to disallow modification. Penthouse involved a participation agreement in which a
"lead lender" (Queen City Savings and Loan Association) agreed to loan Penthouse the necessary
funds. The lead lender would then make agreements with "participating lenders" which would
provide a portion of the necessary funds. As the name implies, the lead lender primarily would be
responsible for overseeing the details of the entire loan package. The Penthouse court was con-
cerned that in this type of arrangement, an implied extension would bind the participating lenders
without giving them notice of the changed terms in the loan agreement. In such complex lending
arrangements, the co-lenders must be able to trust that the agreement will be enforced as written.
Id. at 981.
95. For a discussion of the impact of reliance on contract principles, see generally G. GIL-
MoRE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
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options should include a statement preserving the lender's rights under
the contract. This, of course, may impact negatively upon negotiations
and be perceived by the borrower as a veiled threat. Most borrowers
would not agree readily to a list of options that included a lender's right
to demand payment immediately upon maturity of the loan and an op-
tion to secure any collateral. Thus, a lender should, at the very least,
place a disclaimer in all written proposals, stating that all contractual
provisions remain in force and strict compliance will continue to be re-
quired. Second, because reasonable reliance by the borrower is an in-
creasingly important factor in determining liability, lenders should
avoid making verbal assurances that run counter to the terms of the
written agreement. Yet, even this may prove inadequate to protect the
lender's rights. Indeed, the Fairco and Bank Computer courts focused
on the negotiations themselves as creating the impression that financing
would be continued and stated that the borrowers were justified in rely-
ing on this impression." Thus, from a practical standpoint, a lender can
best avoid liability by assuming that once it renegotiates the loan with
the borrower, the bank has suspended its contractual rights. The bank
can then enforce its contractual rights by notifying the borrower for-
mally of its intent to do so and by providing the borrower with a rea-
sonable time to react.
b. Demand Notes
A lender also can protect itself by using a demand note to loan
money. Generally, a demand note is considered due and payable on its
execution, whether or not there is a prior demand. 97 Thus, the only ob-
ligation placed on a holder of a demand note under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (U.C.C.) is to seek enforcement of the instrument within
the statute of limitations." This kind of note expressly gives a lender
virtually unfettered discretion in dealing with the borrower, thereby
making it difficult for a borrower to assert any reliance-based argu-
ments. Courts, however, have restricted demand notes in several ways.
One constraint some courts have imposed on demand notes is a
good faith restriction on the lender's discretion when enforcing the
96. But see Centerre Bank v. Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding
that a borrower's reliance on a bank officer's representations was unjustified because the officer
told the borrower on several occasions that any loan extension would have to gain approval from a
bank committee); cf. Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's Bank & Trust Co., 713 S.W.2d 517 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986) (stating that lender's silence regarding an intent to call a loan due during negotiations for an
extension of the note was not a violation of its good faith duty).
97. U.C.C. § 3-122(1)(b) (1987); see also Spencer Cos. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 81 Bankr.
194 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987); Allied Sheet Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 10 Wash.
App. 530, 518 P.2d 734, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 967 (1974).
98. Murphy v. First Nat'l Bank, 182 Ga. App. 788, 357 S.E.2d 266 (1987).
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note.99 K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.100 involved this type of con-
straint. In K.M.C. Co. Irving Trust agreed to provide K.M.C. with a line
of credit in exchange for K.M.C.'s execution of a loan agreement that
included a demand clause. K.M.C. also was required to place all re-
ceipts in a blocked account to which Irving Trust had sole access. With-
out notice, Irving Trust subsequently refused to loan K.M.C. any
money even though the line of credit had not been exhausted. This left
K.M.C. without operating capital, which caused its collapse. The
K.M.C. Co. court stated that the demand provision of the loan agree-
ment was like an acceleration clause and, therefore, should have been
implemented only when reasonable and fair.' 01 Thus, the court held
that good faith required Irving Trust to have notified K.M.C. of its
credit termination with sufficient lead time to have allowed K.M.C. to
seek alternate financing.10 2 This requirement, however, ran counter to
the expressed terms of the agreement, which called for payment on de-
mand, and is difficult to reconcile with the U.C.C., which puts no such
restriction on demand notes. 03 Consequently, several courts have criti-
cized the K.M.C. Co. holding and have declined to follow its
reasoning.' 0 '
99. See generally Special Project Note, "Bad Faith Breach," supra.
100. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985); see also Reid v. Key Bank of S. Me., 821 F.2d 9 (1st Cir.
1987).
101. K.M.C. Co., 757 F.2d at 760.
102. Id. at 759.
103. See U.C.C. § 1-208 official comment (1987). Although U.C.C. § 1-208 provides that an
"at will" or "when ... insecure" acceleration term can only be enforced in good faith, the Official
Comment to this section states that such a restriction does not apply to demand instruments
"whose very nature permits call at any time with or without reason." Id.
104. See, e.g., Spencer, 81 Bankr. at 199 (refusing to accept K.M.C. Co. as the correct inter-
pretation of New York law, stating that the K.M.C. Co. court "apparently overlooked the Com-
ment to [§ 1-208]"); Flagship Nat'l Bank v. Gray Distrib. Sys., Inc., 485 So. 2d 1336, 1341 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (stating: "We refrain from following K.M.C. because we find that the court's
citation of section ... [1-208], which is inapplicable to demand notes, renders its holding some-
what suspect"); Centerre, 705 S.W.2d at 48 (stating that "this court does not find [K.M.C. Co.]
. . . persuasive"); see also Taggart & Taggart Seed, Inc. v. First Tenn. Bank Natl Ass'n, 684 F.
Supp. 230 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (citing K.M.C. Co. but not following it); Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Willis
Denney Ford, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 846, 269 S.E.2d 916 (1980) (observing that a demand note is on its
face immediately due, and an obligor should not be able to raise a good faith claim). The court in
Shaughnessy v. Mark Twain State Bank, 715 S.W.2d 944 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986), distinguished
K.M.C. Co. because the bank did not require Shaughnessy to deposit his proceeds into a blocked
account.
In distinguishing several cases that did not find the lender liable, the K.M.C. Co. court stated:
"Nor is it clear that the exercise of absolute discretion under the agreements in question [in these
other cases] conferred on the banks the same power over the continued existence of the debtors as
in the instant case." K.M.C. Co., 757 F.2d at 759. Thus, K.M.C. Co. need not stand for the broad
proposition that all demand notes have an implied obligation of good faith. Rather, when a bank
places itself in a position to have almost complete control over a borrower's cash flow, then a duty
to act in good faith will be imposed despite the use of a demand note. Yet, even this interpretation
936
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Courts also restrict the scope of demand notes by defining them
narrowly. For example, because demand notes become due and payable
upon execution, courts do not allow loans with language contradicting
these conditions to attain demand note status.05 In scrutinizing the
consistency of the language, a court will examine not only the demand
note itself, but also all supporting documentation. 10 For example, in
Spencer Cos. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.107 a Massachusetts bank-
ruptcy court concluded that a demand note, listing various contingen-
cies that would render the note payable, was not intended to be due
and payable on its execution. 08 If one of these contingencies did not
occur, the lender was required to make a demand for payment prior to
enforcing its contractual remedies.' 09 Similarly, in Shaughnessy v.
Mark Twain State Bank' 0 a Missouri Court of Appeals found several
terms in the loan documentation inconsistent with a demand note.
These terms included the language "until maturity, March 6, 1984" and
"become due at option of holder.""' Because this language did not
will be difficult to apply. "Control" will be determined by the amount of financial damage a lender
will cause by exercising its contractual rights. If a borrower is financially weak, then the exercise of
these rights will result in more serious economic damage. It is precisely when the borrower is finan-
cially weak, however, that these rights become valuable.
Thus, under this type of rule, a lender must engage in a causation analysis regarding the
economic effects of its contemplated actions. Only if the lender's actions do not cause serious eco-
nomic damage will the lender be deemed not to control substantially the borrower and be able to
avoid the imposition of a good faith obligation. Such a process provides little certainty to a lender
regarding his contractual rights.
Another court, In re Red Cedar Constr. Co., 63 Bankr. 228 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1986), at-
tempted to limit K.M.C. Co.'s good faith duty to give notice only to loans involving future ad-
vances or disbursements (e.g., a line of credit) and only when the lender had no reason to believe
that the borrower would not be able to repay. The Red Cedar court stated that notice would have
no effect upon a borrower who could not secure alternate financing. Id. at 238. The Shaughnessy
court noted the anomalous result that limiting K.M.C. Co. to future advances would achieve: bor-
rowers would be protected from a bank's refusal to disburse funds, but would be given no protec-
tion against the more onerous burden of having a demand note called due. Shaughnessy, 715
S.W.2d at 953. Applying the Red Cedar limitation would fail to protect those borrowers who most
need safeguards such as good faith and instead protect those who may not need such protection.
Thus, many courts seem to recognize the instability that would result if K.M.C. Co. were given a
broad interpretation. Yet, short of outright rejection, it is difficult to arrive at a satisfactory limita-
tion of this holding.
105. E.g., Spencer, 81 Bankr. at 198. Simply calling an instrument a demand note does not
make it so. Courts look beyond such labels and attempt to determine the intent of the parties from
the language of the agreement and surrounding circumstances. Id.
106. But see Allied Sheet Metal, 10 Wash. App. at 530, 518 P.2d at 734 (stating that the
provisions of a security agreement were irrelevant and inapplicable because the lender's actions
were based on uncontroverted terms of the demand note).
107. 81 Bankr. 194 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987).
108. Id. at 198.
109. Id.
110. 715 S.W.2d 944 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
111. Id. at 951; see also Reid v. Key Bank of S. Me., 821 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating that a
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show an intention for the notes to mature upon execution, the court
concluded that a demand only could be made prior to maturity if a
default occurred.112
Lastly, the prima facie tort doctrine limits a lender's discretion
under a demand note. This tort provides a cause of action to a party
which is injured intentionally by a lawful but unjustified act.113 The in-
tent to injure must be an actual intent to injure, not merely an intent to
act.114 A lender, however, has a defense to this tort so long as he acts
with a valid business purpose.11 5 Thus, the ability to establish a prima
facie tort protects a borrower from malicious acts of the lender, but
does not hinder a lender which is earnestly seeking to protect a valid
business interest.
III. REQUIREMENT OF A WRITING
The Statute of Frauds, in a limited number of circumstances, re-
quires that an agreement be written in order for it to be enforceable.1 '
Credit agreements traditionally have not been subject to the Statute of
Frauds.1 7 Recently, however, several state legislatures have amended
note was not a demand note because it listed certain occurrences which would render the note in
default); Reese v. First Mo. Bank & Trust Co., 664 S.W.2d 530 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that a
promissory note was an installment note because many of the provisions in the loan documenta-
tion were inconsistent with the definition of a demand note).
112. Shaughnessy, 715 S.W.2d at 951.
113. See Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's Bank & Trust Co., 713 S.W.2d 517 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
Four elements comprise the prima facie tort doctrine: 1) intentional lawful act by the defendant; 2)
intent to cause injury to the plaintiff; 3) injury to the plaintiff; and 4) absence of any justification
or an insufficient justification for the acts. See id. at 543; see also Special Project Note, Lender
Liability, supra, notes 187-98 and accompanying text.
114. Rigby, 713 S.W.2d at 544.
115. See Centerre, 705 S.W.2d at 42. Centerre adopted a balancing test to determine
whether a particular act was justified. This test stemmed from the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 870, comments f, g, h and i. The comments to this section list four factors to be balanced: 1) the
"nature and seriousness of the harm"; 2) the "interests promoted by the actor's conduct"; 3) the
type of means used; and 4) the actor's motive. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 870 comments f,
g, h & i (1979).
116. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 6.1, at 370. The Statute of Frauds requires writings
for contracts that:
(1) "[C]harge any executor or administrator upon any special promise, to answer damages out
of his own estate ... ;" (2) . . . "charge the defendant upon any special promise to answer
for the debt, default or miscarriages of another person" (the suretyship provision); (3) . . .
"charge any person upon any agreement made upon consideration of marriage" . . . ; (4)
[charge] for the "sale of lands. . . or any interest in or concerning them" (the land contract
provision); (5) [charge any person that is] "not to be performed within the space of one year
from the making thereof" (the one-year provision).
Id.
117. The one-year provision might possibly apply to the lender-borrower context because
most borrowers take longer than a year to repay loans. Courts, however, dislike this provision and
have interpreted it to mean "not performable" within one year. Id. § 6.4, at 392. All loans can be
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their Statute of Frauds to include agreements between lenders and bor-
rowers. 1"8 Including lender-borrower agreements within the Statute of
Frauds, however, has little real impact on actual lending practices be-
cause most lenders already use written documentation in their loan
agreements. Indeed, an amendment to the Statute of Frauds in this
area may be viewed as an attack on the body of law that has developed
around the lender-borrower relationship, rather than as an attack on
lending practices themselves. This section examines the potential im-
pact of the Statute of Frauds on lender-borrower cases.
In general, the Statute of Frauds will affect a contract in at least
two ways. First, in order to be enforceable, the original contract must
be in writing" 9 and signed by the party to be charged. Second, any
modification that falls within the statute must meet the statute's re-
quirements. 2 0 The Statute of Frauds should not be confused with the
parol evidence rule. Although the Statute of Frauds requires a writing,
unlike the parol evidence rule, it does not require that this writing be
integrated. Thus, a writing can meet the requirements of the Statute of
Frauds, but not trigger the application of the parol evidence rule.
Certain situations may cause a contract to be excepted from the
Statute of Frauds. For example, the Statute of Frauds does not apply if
there has been part performance, or if one of the parties is promissorily
estopped.' 2' Underlying these exceptions is a reliance-based theory of
contract and the judiciary's unwillingness to allow a party to shield
wrongful conduct by asserting the Statute of Frauds as a defense. These
exceptions will allow courts, in jurisdictions that have included the
lender-borrower relationship in their Statute of Frauds, to waive the
repaid within one year and hence fulfill the terms of the obligation. Given this construction, few
loans, if any, will fall within the traditional Statute of Frauds. See Third Nat'l Bank & Trust v.
Sinder, No. CA9995 (Ohio Ct. App. June 18, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file) (stating that
an alleged oral contract for a bank to give advice to a borrower was not within Statute of Frauds
because it could have been performed within one year).
118. See GA. CODE ANN. § 13-5-30(7) (Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 513.33 (West Supp.
1989). South Dakota also addressed this area, but specifically exempted revolving loan account
arrangements and credit card agreements from its coverage. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 53-8-2
(Supp. 1988). The Wall Street Journal recently reported that California passed a law that will
prevent customers from suing banks for discontinuing credit, or refusing to extend new loans with-
out a written agreement to perform such an obligation. California Banks May Find Haven in a
Law Curbing Suits on Lending, Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 1988, at B8, col. 1. The article notes that
exceptions to this rule will be made in several situations, including that of alleged fraud. Id. The
act becomes effective Jan. 1, 1989. Id.
119. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 15, § 19-29. The writing must set forth with
reasonable certainty: 1) the identity of the contracting parties; 2) the subject matter of the con-
tract; and 3) the essential terms of the contract. Id.
120. Id. § 19-37.
121. See id. §§ 19-15, 19-48.
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requirements of the Statute of Frauds.12 Of course, a carefully drafted
statute may restrict a court's ability to apply these exceptions.
A. Minnesota Approach
Minnesota is one of the states that has amended its Statute of
Frauds to include credit agreements.2 3 Subdivision 2 of the Minnesota
statute places credit agreements within the Statute of Frauds. If the
legislature simply wanted to place all credit agreements within the Stat-
ute of Frauds, this subdivision would fulfill that purpose. Of course, this
subdivision alone would have little impact on cases involving part per-
formance and promissory estoppel. From this perspective, subdivision 3
is the most significant provision of the amendment, equipping lenders
with a powerful weapon to thwart recent lender liability holdings.
Subdivision 3, by focusing on what constitutes "new" credit agree-
ments, deals with actions subsequent to written agreements. The speci-
ficity of this subdivision forecloses a court from applying reliance-based
legal theories to certain actions of the lender. Two cases have been de-
cided under this statute since its enactment in May 1985.
In Becker v. First American State Bank24 the plaintiff alleged that
the bank, through its president, orally agreed to continue financing the
plaintiff's business if he would reduce his indebtedness. In reliance on
this oral agreement, the plaintiff immediately sold several parcels of
land at significantly less than market value. The bank subsequently
honored the plaintiff's overdrafts in excess of one hundred fifty thou-
sand dollars and had the plaintiff sign an unsecured note for one hun-
dred and forty-five thousand dollars to cover these overdrafts. The
plaintiff requested an additional loan, but the bank refused. The plain-
122. Both the Fairco and Bank Computer holdings were based on principles of estoppel. An
amendment to the Statute of Frauds would have little impact on such cases.
123. MNN. STAT. ANN. § 513.33 (West Supp. 1989). The amendment states:
Subd.2. Credit agreements to be in writing. A debtor may not maintain an action on a credit
agreement unless the agreement is in writing, expresses consideration, sets forth the relevant
terms and conditions, and is signed by the creditor and the debtor.
Subd. 3. Actions not considered agreements. (a) The following actions do not give rise to a
claim that a new credit agreement is created, unless the agreement satisfies the requirements
of subdivision 2:
(1) the rendering of financial advice by a creditor to a debtor;
(2) the consultation by a creditor with a debtor; or
(3) the agreement by a creditor to take certain actions, such as entering into a new credit
agreement, forbearing from exercising remedies under prior credit agreements, or extending
installments due under prior credit agreements.
(b) A credit agreement may not be implied from the relationship, fiduciary, or otherwise, of
the creditor and the debtor.
Id.
124. 420 N.W.2d 239 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
[Vol. 42:917
LENDER LIABILITY
tiff then sued the defendant-bank for damages arising from his "quick
sale" of property.125
A Minnesota trial court granted the bank's motion for summary
judgment, and the appellate court affirmed. 126 The appellate court held
that the bank's recommendation for the plaintiff to reduce his indebt-
edness constituted a "rendering of advice" pursuant to the amended
Minnesota statute.
12 7
In Fronning v. Blume 28 the plaintiff purchased a farm from his
parents in September 1977, financing the purchase with a contract for
deed. The plaintiff used the defendant-bank to finance both his farm
operations and his personal needs. Between September 1977 and April
1984, the plaintiff's debt grew from 67,500 dollars to over 132,000 dol-
lars. The loans were secured by the plaintiff's farm machinery and
livestock.
1 29
The plaintiff regularly consulted John Blume, a loan officer of the
bank, on all financial matters. Blume's record of the plaintiff's account
evidenced a steady effort by the bank to secure the plaintiff's debt fur-
ther. In April 1985 the plaintiff signed a note that renewed his 132,000
dollar loan due in November 1985. At that time the plaintiff also exe-
cuted two additional agreements and promissory notes for lines of
credit totalling 31,500 dollars. The bank disbursed 24,500 dollars of this
amount to the plaintiff, and the remaining 7,000 dollars was designated
for the purchase of a tractor. The plaintiff, however, obtained alternate
financing for this purchase. These credit agreements did not obligate
the defendant-bank to lend the plaintiff any money, but rather allowed
the bank to make these loans in its sole discretion. 130
On April 17, at the bank's request, the plaintiff and his family went
to Blume's office to sign a document. The plaintiff's father objected to
signing the document, but Blume assured them that the document
served only an in-house function and did not "mean a thing."' 131 Al-
though the plaintiff looked at the document, he neglected to see the
printed word "mortgage." In September 1985 the bank refused to ex-
tend further credit to the plaintiff. The plaintiff subsequently discov-
ered that the bank had a mortgage on his property. Blume discussed
with the plaintiff's attorney the possibility of an auction sale in Febru-
ary 1986. The plaintiff then sold his equipment and hogs and applied
125. Id. at 240.
126. Id. at 239.
127. Id. at 241 (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 513.33(3)(a)(1) (West Supp. 1989)).
128. 429 N.W.2d 310 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
129. Id. at 311.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 312.
1989]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
the 53,164 dollars received toward his debt with the bank.'82
The plaintiff sued the bank, alleging that the bank fraudulently ob-
tained the mortgage and acted in bad faith by cutting off the plaintiff's
credit without notice and by refusing to release promised funds. A Min-
nesota trial court granted the bank's motions for summary judgment on
both of the plaintiff's claims.13 3 The trial court found that Blume's
statements regarding the nature and effect of the mortgage were not
fraudulent inducement because the document clearly stated that it was
a mortgage and set forth its significant legal effects. Blume's statements
were contrary to the document's terms, thereby making the plaintiff's
reliance upon them unreasonable. Because there was no reasonable reli-
ance on the part of the plaintiff, the court refused to allow parol evi-
dence to vary the terms of the written agreement.
13 4
The Minnesota Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial
court's determination concerning the issue of fraud.135 The court held
that Blume's statements could be admitted to prove that the parties
never intended to enter into a mortgage arrangement, notwithstanding
the language of the document.3 6 The court of appeals stated that the
parol evidence rule did not exclude evidence of fraudulent oral repre-
sentations that induced a party to enter into a written agreement. 137
Summary judgment on the issue of fraud, the court held, was inappro-
priate because the trier of fact could find that the parties never in-
tended to enter into a mortgage agreement.138
The appellate court, however, affirmed the trial court's summary
judgment on the issue of bad faith.'39 The court examined and rejected
three arguments made by the plaintiff under this claim. The plaintiff
first contended that the bank acted in bad faith by not fulfilling its oral
promises to give the plaintiff a larger part of the proceeds received by
the bank from the sale of the plaintiff's grain. 40 Pursuant to the par-
ties' security agreement, these grain checks were intended to pay off the
plaintiff's prior loan. Thus, any money given to the plaintiff from these
proceeds, the court reasoned, would result in a new loan. The defend-
ant-bank's alleged oral promises, therefore, constituted a credit agree-
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 313.
135. Id. at 314.
136. Id. at 313.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 314.
140. Id. Apparently the plaintiff and the bank had some sort of security agreement whereby
the plaintiff's customers made payments to the bank. Id. Using accounts receivable to secure a
short-term loan is a common practice in the banking industry.
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ment under the Minnesota statute and required a writing.141
Second, the plaintiff further alleged that the bank acted in bad
faith by refusing to extend further credit beginning in September
1985.142 The plaintiff maintained that his course of dealing with the
bank required the bank to extend credit, or to give notice that no new
credit would be permitted. The court concluded that the Minnesota
statute prevented the creation of a credit agreement solely through im-
plications from the relationship of the parties or their past dealings. 14 3
Lastly, the plaintiff argued that he was entitled to the undisbursed
7,000 dollars that had been made available to him under the discretion-
ary lines of credit. Although conceding that these agreements satisfied
the Minnesota statute, the court held that the contracts expressly dis-
claimed any obligation to dispense these funds.1 44 The plaintiff coun-
tered this ruling by arguing that the past dealings of the parties created
this obligation. The court disagreed, concluding that the Minnesota
Commercial Code allows the parties' course of dealings to interpret the
written agreement, but not to contradict it. 14 5 The plaintiff offered no
evidence of a prior agreement between these parties that would have
caused the plaintiff to believe that he was to receive the full amount of
the loan regardless of the loan's purpose. Moreover, the purpose of the
loan had disappeared because the plaintiff had obtained alternate
financing.
Both of these cases illustrate the pivotal role of subdivision 3
within the framework of this amendment. Lacking the specific language
of this subdivision, the Becker and Fronning courts, guided by recent
decisions in other jurisdictions, could have decided for the borrower de-
spite the requirement of the Statute of Frauds. Such statutory specific-
ity, therefore, will protect lenders when dealing with borrowers after
making a loan.
B. Georgia Approach
Georgia's amendment to its Statute of Frauds requires a writing for





145. Id.; see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.1-205(1) (West 1966) (defining a course of dealing as
"a sequence of previous conduct between the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to
be regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and
other conduct").
146. GA. CODE ANN. § 13-5-30(7) (Supp. 1988). The amendment reads in part:
To make the following obligations binding on the promisor, the promise must be in writing
and signed by the party to be charged therewith or some person lawfully authorized by him:
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ute on July 1, 1988, no cases have been decided under it. Nevertheless,
certain observations can be made.
This amendment places few restrictions on courts. Although all
commitments to lend money must be in writing, lenders will find little
protection from such language. The doctrines of part performance and
promissory estoppel, coupled with recent holdings in other jurisdictions,
provide Georgia courts with the necessary ingredients to except a con-
tract from the statute's requirements. Thus, this sparsely worded stat-
ute may have little impact on lender liability cases.
Courts, however, could look beyond the wording of the statute in
order to enforce the "purpose" behind the statute. If courts consider
this amendment as a legislative desire to bridle recent lender liability
cases, they could interpret "commitment" expansively and include the
same actions cited by the Minnesota statute in subdivision 3. If nothing
else, the Georgia statute gives courts the latitude to strike a balance
between banking stability and borrower recourse based on the equities
of the situation.147 This flexibility works in the borrower's favor and in
this regard is superior to the Minnesota statute, which enhances bank-
ing stability by foreclosing borrower recourse in certain situations re-
gardless of the equities. The direction courts will take with Georgia's
amendment, however, remains unknown. Thus, banks are provided with
little guidance to conduct current lending transactions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Three concerns underlie attempts to resolve lender-borrower dis-
putes: maintenance of banking stability through the enforcement of
written contracts, avoidance of adhesion contracts, and provision of le-
gal recourse to borrowers against abusive lending practices. Unfortu-
nately, because these concerns are at odds with each other, no
guidelines have been established that satisfactorily address each con-
cern. Thus, the best guidelines will be clear rules that properly balance
these concerns.
In contract law, courts have sought to provide this clarity and bal-
ance by enforcing disclaimer clauses in written contracts. Disclaimer
clauses protect lenders' written agreements from the demise of the pa-
(2) A promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;
(5) Any agreement that is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof;
(6) Any promise to revive a debt barred by a statute of limitations; and




rol evidence rule. Borrowers cannot sign an agreement containing a dis-
claimer clause and then allege that they relied on a promise not
contained in the written agreement. These disclaimer clauses, however,
encourage the use of boilerplate language and may be a trap for borrow-
ers who are unaware of the legal effect of these clauses. Moreoever, a
borrower, lacking sufficient bargaining power, may have no alternative
other than to sign an agreement containing such a clause. The enforce-
ment of disclaimer clauses, therefore, maintains banking stability but
fails to address any concerns of the borrowers.
Promissory estoppel and other reliance-based legal theories in-
creasingly influence the judiciary's contractual analysis and strengthen
borrowers' claims. This influence is particularly evident in cases involv-
ing negotiations subsequent to the written agreement. Although these
theories provide borrowers with recourse against lenders and help to
circumvent adhesion contracts, it is difficult to predict the actions that
will give rise to a claim under these theories. Thus, the integrity of
lending agreements is weakened, and banks are uncertain about the ac-
tions that they should take to keep their loans secure while still avoid-
ing liability.
Several state legislatures have amended their Statutes of Frauds in
an effort to address lender-borrower concerns. This solution balances
lender-borrower concerns in several ways. First, banking stability would
be maintained because of the deference given to written agreements.
Certain lender-borrower agreements would have to be in writing to be
enforceable. An amendment to the Statute of Frauds would affect both
initial agreements and any subsequent modifications. From a lender's
perspective, this solution is superior to a disclaimer clause because of
its greater scope. A disclaimer clduse only impacts on actions prior to
the written agreement, whereas an amendment to the Statute of Frauds
affects all actions, prior and subsequent to the written agreement.
Second, this solution addresses the borrowers' concerns. Although
an agreement normally must be in writing to be enforceable, the doc-
trines of partial performance and promissory estoppel are available to
borrowers and help to police the actions of the lender. Thus, unlike the
disclaimer clause solution, a borrower may assert reliance-based causes
of action despite the requirement of a writing.
Lastly, a carefully drafted amendment to the Statute of Frauds
provides clear guidelines to lenders and borrowers concerning the effect
of particular actions on written agreements. Having advance knowledge
that certain actions will not be construed as an agreement unless made
in writing, lenders will be more willing to perform these acts. Hence,
assuming that the affected actions will include negotiations and render-
ing advice, greater cooperation between lender and borrower may re-
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sult. This certainty also may reduce transaction costs because lenders
could better calculate the risks inherent in making loans. An amend-
ment to the Statute of Frauds, therefore, would balance lender-bor-
rower concerns and bring greater certainty to the lending process.
Robert D. Rowe
